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Abstract 
     We address the particular cyber attack technique known as stack buffer overflow in GNU/Linux operating systems, which are 
widely used in HPC environments. The buffer overflow problem has been around for quite some time and continues to be an ever 
present issue. We develop a mechanism to successfully detect and react whenever a stack buffer overflow occurs. Our solution 
requires no compile-time support and so can be applied to any program, including legacy or closed source software for which the 
source code is not available. This makes it especially useful in HPC environments where given their complexity and scope of the 
computing system, incidents like overflows might be difficult to detect and react to accordingly. 
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1. Introduction 
     Most HPC systems run some variant of the GNU/Linux operating system, such as the CLUMEQ in Quebec, 
which uses CentOS 6.3. Tackling security issues in GNU/Linux is therefore a priority for HPC applications. One of 
the most pressing issues is buffer overflow. Indeed, a study that surveyed Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS) data between 1988 and 2012 showed that buffer overflows were the most often reported vulnerabilities, at 
roughly 14% of the total amount1. Thus, tackling such a recurring problem in such a widely used operating system is 
a priority for researchers and various industries alike. 
     In this paper we consider the particular kind of buffer overflows that happens on the stack. The outcome of such 
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an overflow is usually an execution error of the program, but if the overflow is performed by a malicious entity, then 
it can be exploited and can lead to the execution of malicious code.  
     We develop a solution for detecting stack buffer overflow at run time and without any compile-time support. Our 
solution is therefore particularly useful for closed source or legacy software, with no available source code. Our 
system actively analyses an executing program, reacts to the appropriate opcodes, and makes sure that the control 
flow has not been tampered with. Should a problem be detected, we send a message to the system administrator with 
pertinent information that can be used for subsequent forensic investigations. 
     Our system detects all the stack overflow events at the expense of significant overhead on the running time. We 
therefore offer a faster version, whose functionality is based on empirical observations on code that is likely to be 
malicious. While we greatly reduce the overhead this way, the faster version is no longer guaranteed to catch all the 
overflows. Further investigations are needed to assess the effectiveness of this version.  
     Our solution uses ptrace, a tool which is available in most GNU/Linux distributions, and so should be easily 
applicable to any such a distribution. 
2. Literature review 
     Buffer overflow has been an actively research area throughout the history of Computer Science. The proposed 
solutions include both hardware and software approaches. Some offer mechanisms for preventing overflows from 
occurring, while others react once overflows happen. 
     Address space layout randomization (ASLR)2 introduces randomness into the virtual memory layout of a process 
in order to change the binary mapping of stack memory regions and dynamic library linking before the process 
executes in order to nullify any attacks that operate under the assumption of known static values. 
     Stack canaries are values that are inserted into known locations in memory in order to detect buffer overflows 
due to the fact that when one happens the first data to be corrupted will usually be the canary3,4,5. 
     Bounds checking6 operates by keeping track of the address boundaries for objects, buffers and arrays, and 
constantly checking the load and store operations that access those resources.  
     SecureBit27 works on top of SecureBit, which introduces a hardware bit to protect the integrity of addresses, 
while SecureBit2 works to protect SecureBit.  
     Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT)8 tags untrusted data in order to track it through the system. A 
hierarchical model is put in place so that new data that is derived from untrusted data can be generated. 
     Chaperon9 and Valgrind are commercial tools that intercept malloc and free calls directly from a binary 
executable. 
     The Never-execute bit (Nx-bit)10 represents a mark on certain areas of memory which makes them non-
executable, so that the processor will refuse to execute code within those areas. 
     One research work11 proposes a hardware and software hybrid solution to protect against buffer overflows by 
introducing new assembly functions and a method using boundary checks. 
A recent investigation12 introduces a new instruction to limit the consumption of system resources by the process. 
     The idea of monitoring the stack during the execution of call and return opcodes was proposed earlier13,14. A 
proof-of-concept system that protects the instruction pointer in 32-bit systems (EIP) from modification using kernel 
properties was presented. 
3. Solution  
     The stack is a last-in-first-out (LIFO) list that will store the values pushed by the call opcodes. These values 
will then be used by ret opcodes to return to the address after the corresponding call. Our solution must work 
during run time and actively detect the overflow whenever it happens. We must be able to work with both 32-bit and 
64-bit architectures. Therefore our solution will intercept the appropriate instruction pointers for both architectures 
(eip/rip respectively) and whenever a call opcode is detected, the next address after it will be stored in a 
separate buffer that we control. Then when a ret is issued, we will verify that the value has not been tampered 
with, by comparing the value in the stack to the value in the buffer we control. Finally, should a problem be 
detected, an automatic message will be sent to the system administrator through the network with the pertinent 
information. 
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     Our solution works using the ptrace system call15 as the main engine, ptrace is a built-in tool in GNU/Linux 
operating systems that will allow us to intercept certain resources during the execution of a process for analysis, thus 
eliminating the need for any extra resources. 
3.1. Procedure 
In practice, in order to execute the program under the control of our system we launch it like this: 
./<launch ctl> <target program> 
where <launch ctl> is our control program (that controls the launching of other programs) and <target 
program> is the process to be analyzed. Under the hood we need first to tell the kernel that a process will be 
traced. This is accomplished with the PTRACE_TRACEME call whose syntax is: 
ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, pid,...); 
     In this call pid is the process id to trace. This is usually followed by an execve() system call which is used to 
obtain said pid. It is worth mentioning that in our code the pid is a value input by the user and then sent to a 
function, so we use: 
execl(programname, programname,(char*)0); 
where execl() is used to obtain the pid which is stored in the variable programname. Once 
PTRACE_TRACEME is issued, the kernel is aware that the process is being traced and ptrace splits the process 
into two parts, a parent and a child. This mechanism allows ptrace to hand control back and forth from the parent 
to the child in order to detect or perform operations as needed. In this case, the child will be executing the process 
and the parent will check for arguments or look into registers. For our construction the child executes the 
execve() system call and so hands control over to the parent. Now we must issue a wait() call to stop the 
execution of the process during the first instruction, we accomplish this in our code with: 
wait(&wait_status); 
     The parameter wait_status is just a variable used to manage the wait signal. It is at this point that we must 
read the current register values of the process. We accomplish that with PTRACE_GETREGS to obtain the registers 
and then PTRACE_PEEKTEXT to obtain the values we need. Our implementation of this in our code is as follows: 
To obtain the registers we do: 
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, child_pid, 0, &regs); 
where child_pid is the process being traced. Then to obtain the instruction pointer for our 64-bit platform we 
use: 
ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKTEXT, child_pid, regs.rip,0); 
where child_pid is the process being traced and regs.rip is the instruction pointer for 64-bit architectures. 
We use temporary variables to store this value. 
     At this point in our solution we have successfully stopped the execution of the process during run-time, obtained 
the value for the instruction pointer, and we must now proceed to see if the current instruction being executed is a 
call or a ret. We accomplish this by storing the hexadecimal values of the instruction and evaluating for 
opcodes.  To look for a call opcode we then do: 
if (op==0xe8 || op==0x9a || op==0xff || op2 == 0xff00) 
The following on the other hand will determine whether the opcode is a ret code: 
if (op==0xc3 || op==0xcb || op==0xc2 || op==0xca) 
     At this stage, we must evaluate each condition accordingly. When a call is found, we will obtain the stack 
pointer and then we store that in a buffer under our control. To obtain the stack pointer for our 64-bit platform we 
use: 
ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid, regs.rsp, 0); 
where child_pid is the process being traced and regs.rsp is the stack pointer for 64-bit architectures.  
     If on the other hand a ret is detected, then we must check whether the return address on the stack has not been 
modified. To accomplish this we obtain the current return address from the stack and compare it with the latest value 
stored in our buffer. If both values are the same, then nothing is wrong and the program continues. However, if the 
values are different, we then compare the current value in the stack to the value next-to-last in our buffer; if they still 
do not match, we then compare it to the next value in our buffer, and so on. It is important to note that our buffer is 
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effectively a stack, which stores the latest value on the top which is then compared with the value of the normal 
stack when a ret happens. 
     Once the comparison between the current value on the stack and the values in our buffer is complete, if the 
current value in the stack is not found then something modified it on the stack and therefore we assume there has 
been an attack such as a buffer overflow. If this is the case, we now issue a real-time message to the system 
administrator and kill the process. The message includes the network address of the host, the current system time of 
the host, the hostname, and the instruction that was executed when the incident occurred (in hexadecimal). While an 
argument could be made regarding the actual necessity of the message, it is important to remember what we 
established at the beginning of this document: we seek to develop a solution that not only automatically detects 
problems, but also issues notifications that contains precise information. In this case the fact that we are sending 
valuable information like time, hostname, network address and even more so, the actual instruction that caused the 
problem, can potentially save the user time and other resources should the need to perform forensic analysis arise.  
     At this point in our solution, we have successfully stopped the execution of the process during run-time, obtained 
the value for the instruction pointer and evaluated whether the current instruction being executed is a call or a 
ret. If a call was found then the corresponding value is stored in a buffer, while if a ret was found then we 
compare the current value in the stack to the values stored in the buffer; should a discrepancy be detected, our 
solution automatically issues a message with pertinent information to the system administrator over the network. It 
is now necessary to perform this during every instruction executed in order to fully protect the process. To 
accomplish this, we use PTRACE_SINGLESTEP to advance the process to the next instruction. The code for this is:  
ptrace(PTRACE_SINGLESTEP, child_pid, 0, 0); 
     Finally, the child hands control back to the parent and the parent waits for notification from the kernel with a 
wait() call, thus completing the cycle. This whole sequence will take place during every instruction in the process 
which translates into a successful, working solution that fulfils the objectives we had set out to accomplish. 
3.2. Faster 
     As stated earlier, we have successfully developed a working solution that accomplishes the objectives we had set 
out to achieve. However there is still one issue, namely the time it takes to analyze the process. It all boils down to 
the number of iterations and the use of ptrace; while we cannot optimize ptrace since it is built into the system, 
it is still the case that the bigger the process we are analyzing, the larger the number of instructions to inspect and 
thus, the bigger the buffer will need to be. In practical terms, the time needed to perform our operations will increase 
accordingly because we are effectively analyzing every single instruction. For these reasons we propose a solution 
to this issue taking into consideration write() system calls to detect stack buffer overflows. This is because in 
practice, while monitoring the execution of overflowing processes; we detected that system calls were issued at 
critical points in the buffer overflow exploit. More specifically we identified that such calls were in place when the 
last ret was found (the place of the detection of the overflow). In practical terms, the mechanisms between the 
normal and fast versions are effectively the same; however the change comes via this piece of code which detects 
only write() system calls: 
if((regs.orig_rax == SYS_write)); 
4. Testing 
     In order to test the effectiveness of our system we used the code created by the Mr.Un1k0d3r RingZer0 Team16 
that exploits a buffer overflow to execute a piece of shell code which in turn obtains the password files of a 
GNU/Linux system. Both our normal and fast solutions successfully detected the overflow, killed the target process 
and reported it, both on screen and through the network message sent to the system administrator. Given the 
fundamental steps followed by this exploit, we can safely assume that any stack manipulation will be detected as 
long as it follows the steps described in the previous section. In fact, in order to prove that our normal solution is 
ready to handle any such stack modification, we also modified the values in the stack during execution and after the 
process had been launched. This behavior effectively bypasses counter-measures like ASLR that act once (usually at 
the start of execution) and assume that the process is therefore safe which in practical terms means that it would go 
undetected. Our solution however, detected this execution-time manipulation and reported as expected17.  
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     We also tested GNU/Linux commands commonly used by system administrators as a simple reference for 
verifying the reliability of our system and also for determining its run-time overhead. The timing measurements 
were accomplished using the system time (kernel) requirements by issuing the time command, which does not 
represent a measurement of time as we conventionally measure it. For reference, we will use a system with an AMD 
E2-2000 APU with Radeon(tm) HD Graphics x 2, 7.4 GiB RAM with Fedora 23 64-bit installed on a 120 GB SSD 
and the partition and root directory fully encrypted with LUKS with all pertinent files located in user directories. 
   Table 1 Running time 
Program Detection enabled Time (in seconds) 
/usr/bin/cal No 0.006 
 Yes – Full version 29.47 
 Yes – Fast version 0.015 
/usr/bin/uptime No 0.007 
 Yes – Full version 95.34 
 Yes – Fast version 0.026 
/usr/bin/w No 0.049 
 Yes – Full version 322.41 
 Yes – Fast version 0.196 
Vulnerable executable16  No 0.006 
 Yes – Full version 2.36 
 Yes – Fast version 0.115 
 
     The results show that while the “Full” version of our solution takes a significant amount of time relative to the 
other results, it guarantees that every single instruction will be accounted for which is indeed the ideal solution to 
tackle a problem like stack buffer overflow where the error can potentially be at any instruction. Meanwhile, the fast 
version is significantly faster but at this stage it would only work under specific conditions and is therefore proof-of-
concept. 
     Finally, in order to verify the robustness of our solution when applied to GNU/Linux as an operating system we 
also tested it on different distributions. Specifically the OpenSUSE 13.2, Fedora 21 and Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 
distributions in both their 32-bit and 64-bit versions respectively using virtual machines and also measuring internal 
clock speeds using the time.h standard library of C coded into our solution. The results of these tests and further 
data can be found at the source documentation14,17. 
5. Conclusions 
     More details on the system described in this paper are also available14,17. The complete source code is also 
available14. 
     Our solution works as a counter-measure against stack buffer overflows in GNU/Linux operating systems. We 
produce an applicable result which handles both 32-bit and 64-bit environments, as well as operating during 
execution-time, which is indeed the ideal solution. On top of that, we also provide an alternate solution with the fast 
version. This fast version is a proof-of-concept code that works under a specific set of conditions yet could 
potentially be expanded and developed further. Our first solution can be implemented in server environments for 
deep assembly-code level forensic analysis where every single instruction of an executing process is being 
monitored, while the fast version, although proof-of-concept for 64-bit architectures, presents an alternative to 
significantly reduce the time needed for detections. In particular, our system presents a readily available solution to 
monitor processes in GNU/Linux-based HPC environments without the need to install or include any extra resources 
which are often required by security applications.     
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5.1. Discussion 
     Regarding limitations and time constraints, the performance could be optimized if we were to focus on individual 
GNU/Linux distributions. We could address each combination of distribution and hardware, and filter out the 
specific opcode combinations for each. An example of this behavior is the rex.w + ff prefix call opcode 
which changes depending on the distribution being used. In 32-bit systems, the c2 opcode pushes values onto the 
stack which are handled by certain eax values. This behavior will trigger a false positive which we address by 
skipping any such instance, however we could also strengthen the conditions to intercept this behavior. Currently 
our system does not work with programs that have a graphical user interface. We believe that the cause of this 
shortcoming is related to the way threads are generated in the target process. We leave it as an open problem, though 
it is worth mentioning again that this solution is ready to be implemented in server environments where graphical 
user interface systems are usually not present. 
Compared to other proposed counter-measures against buffer overflows, our solution does not require hardware 
modifications like the ones proposed by the likes of SecureBit, nor any extra set of libraries, data, or source code 
like the ones proposed by stack canaries. In addition, we are successfully able to detect incorrect stack 
manipulations even after the execution has been started; such modifications would bypass countermeasures like 
ASLR but not our system. Compared with the earlier related work13 we do not rely on the severely limited kernel 
memory to back up stack pointers, though this is accomplished at the expense of increasing run-time overhead; we 
thus believe that the faster variant is worth developing in depth as a good compromise between security and 
overhead. Finally, our counter-measure utilizes mechanisms that are not only found in GNU/Linux systems, but in 
most Unix-based systems as well. As such, we believe that our work could be ported over to other Unix-based 
operating systems. This is relevant to HPC environments that may use other unix-based operating systems.  
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